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INTERNET: A SAFE HAVEN FOR
ANONYMOUS INFORMATION THIEVES?
PETER J. TOREN*
I am with the Computer Crime Unit of the Criminal Division of
the United States Department of Justice. We view things some-
what differently than do some of the other panelists who have spo-
ken this morning. You have probably all heard of the story about
Willie Sutton.' Back in the 1920s or 1930s Sutton was asked,
"Why do you rob banks?" His answer was very straightforward,
"Because that's where the money iS."2 What we see now is that
criminals are beginning to use the Internet and computers to com-
mit their criminal acts, "because that's where the money is."
I will provide a brief illustration of some of the issues which
demonstrate that information is an extremely valuable commodity
and some of the problems which are associated with the advent of
new technologies. These problems are exacerbated by criminal
laws, which have not caught up to the new technology.
3
The scenario involves officials of a large American corporation.
They come to the FBI explaining that a former high level execu-
tive of the company has started his own consulting business, has
hired away other engineers from their company, and has con-
tracted with a number of foreign countries to build plants, all us-
* Peter J. Toren is a trial attorney with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section, formerly the Computer Crime Unit, of the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice. As the Section's chief litigator, he is responsible for prosecutions
and investigations involving: computer hacking, criminal copyright infringement, traffick-
ing in counterfeit goods, and theft of trade secrets.
Mr. Toren has published an article in the Pepperdine University Law Review entitled
The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal Law, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 59 (1994). He
is a frequent speaker at conferences on computer crime and other technology issues. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Justice Department.
1 See generally WILLm F. SurrON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976).
2 But see PAUL DICKSON & JOSEPH GOULDEN, MYTH-INFORMED: LEGENDS, CREDOS AND
WRONGHEADED FAcTS WE ALL BELIEVE (1993) (stating that this particular quote attributed
to Sutton was in fact never used by him).
3 See generally Stanley S. Arkin, When Theft Of An Idea Can Be A Crime, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
11, 1996, at 3 (discussing computer crimes and limitations of current laws in dealing with
problem).
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ing the company's proprietary information.4 The FBI says that it
sounds like a great case.
So what does the FBI do? They investigate. They find out that
in the course of his employment, just before he left the company
he downloaded thousands and thousands of documents belonging
to the corporation. The process is really quite easy, because a sin-
gle computer disk can hold upwards of 720 pages of information.5
Using a few computer disks, the executive downloaded reams of
information which was extremely valuable proprietary property of
the corporation.
The FBI feels that the facts present a good case. They present
the facts to the United States Attorney's Office and the United
States Attorney's Office says, "Great, this sounds like a serious
violation. What do we charge him with?" Everybody sits around
and scratches their head a bit, and one person says, "Well we can
charge them with wire fraud because the former executive de-
prived the company of their expectation of their honest services."6
Another person comments that it is not clear that the executive
used a wire in executing the criminal act. Further, the executive
may not have used a telephone in his fraudulent endeavors. But
what about mail fraud? The group responds negatively because
there is no evidence that the executive used the public mails in the
execution of the criminal act.7
Someone else suggests the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986,8 which is currently the only federal criminal statute that is
directly related to computer hacking. The statute, however, deals
with unauthorized access and exceeding authorized access.9 One
attorney argues that the executive did access the company's com-
puter in the commission of the act. The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, however, provides that the access must have been
4 See Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Employers Stung By Stolen Trade Secrets, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
June 1, 1994, at Al.
5 A 3.5 inch disk can store approximately 720 pages of double-spaced type.
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) (stating that anyone who commits fraud by wire, radio, or
television is subject to fine and/or imprisonment).
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (legislating that anyone who attempts to or does defraud
"by placing any object in the Public or Private Mail" is subject to fine and/or imprisonment).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a) (4) (1994) (stating that anyone who "knowingly" accesses com-
puter without authorization and obtains protected information is subject to prosecution).
9 See id. § 1030(a) (1) (1994) (providing that one who "knowingly accessles] computer[s]
without authorization or exceeding authorized access" is subject to fine and/or imprison-




without explicit authorization or that the actor exceeded his au-
thorized access. 10 The statute might not work in this scenario be-
cause the executive had authorization to access the company's
computer. He was a high level executive. He had access and he
had authorization to access any of the company's information.
By now you can imagine that the United States Attorney's Of-
fice and the FBI are extremely concerned about this type of situa-
tion and its result. Someone suggests that the executive can be
charged with the interstate transportation of stolen property."
There is evidence that he not only downloaded the information
from the company's computers, but he also opened a number of
consulting businesses overseas using the corporation's proprietary
information. The executive transferred the corporation's proprie-
tary information via the Internet, across computer lines to offices
within other states and countries.
The property in question, however, was intangible property. 12
There was no physical thing transported across state lines, or
across international boundaries. That presents a problem, be-
cause under title 18, section 2314 of United States Code, which
prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen property, the
property must be a good, ware, or merchandise.' 3
Someone asks if intangible property constitutes a good, ware, or
merchandise. Professor Lessig talked a little bit about the unique
quality and the unique characteristics of information and intangi-
ble property. 14 At the present time, it is not clear under federal
10 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1)-(4) (1994).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) (stating that anyone "transporting, transmitting or trans-
ferring in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandises securities or
money exceeding $5,000, knowing same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud
shall be fined and/or imprisoned"); see also Xan Raskin & Jeannie Schaldach-Paiva, Elev-
enth Survey of White Collar Crime, Computer Crimes, 33 Am. CraM. L. REV. 541, 544-62
(1996) (discussing federal approaches to computer crimes); Camille C. Marion, Note, Com-
puter Viruses and the Law, 93 Dicr L. REV. 625, 641-42 (1989) (discussing various state
statutes addressing computer-related crimes).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that
computer programs and secure computer codes were intangible property, and as such, did
not constitute goods, wares, or merchandise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2314). But
see, e.g., United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 418 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that proprie-
tary information contained in 911 computer text file was not based on deprivation of intan-
gible right but rather property rights).
13 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (citing transportation, transmittal, or transfer of fraudulently ob-
tained goods as offense punishable by fine and/or imprisonment).
14 See Lawrence Lessig, Symposium, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN's J.
LEGAL CoMM:ENT. 635, 638 (1996) (explaining that intellectual property may be used with-
out depriving owner of simultaneous use, but that same is not true of other property types).
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law whether or not intangible property and information consti-
tutes a good, ware, or merchandise.1" The little guidance that ex-
ists is a case out of the Tenth Circuit16 that says purely electronic
signals transmitted across state lines are not considered goods,
wares, or merchandise. 17
So the United States Attorney's Office must decide which stat-
ute is the best to employ to prosecute the executive who has stolen
proprietary information and has cost this American company per-
haps millions and millions of dollars in lost sales to foreign compa-
nies. The end result is a situation in which the individual might
not be able to be prosecuted under a criminal law.'
I think this example illustrates some of the problems we are
faced with in the criminal area. The growth of the Internet and
the effect of the computerization of the criminal area shows that
proprietary economic information which is developed and stored
in computers increases the risk of theft because thieves can access
15 See Henock Gessesse & Karen Sauzaro, Eleventh Survey on White Collar Crime, In-
tellectual Property, 33 AM. CIM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1996) (stating that Tenth Circuit, in
United States v. Brown, determined items must be tangible, but one district court, in
United States v. Riggs, found otherwise); see also Adam S. Ciongoli, et al., Ninth Survey of
White Collar Crime, Computer-Related Crimes, 31 AM. CaIM. L. REV. 425, 431 (1994) (as-
serting that computer programs are not "goods" and "wares" when solely in intangible form
and would most likely be governed by mail and wire fraud statutes).
16 Brown, 925 F.2d at 1301.
17 See United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Stanley S.
Arkin & Michael F. Colosi, The Criminalization of Theft of Technology and Trade Secrets, 3
No. 5 Bus. CrIM:Es BuLL. COMPLIANCE & LrrIG. 4, 4 (1996) (discussing amount of theft of
intellectual property owned by American corporations); Christopher Parkes, Theft of Cor-
porate Secrets Soars, SAN DIEGO UNION Tam., Mar. 22, 1996, at C2 (discussing American
Society for Industrial Security study which measured amount of theft of corporate secrets).
18 Since the date of the speech, Congress has enacted the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831, which criminalizes the misappropriation of trade secrets. The in-
tent of Congress in passing the Act was to cover a situation such as the one described in the
speech:
The principal problem appears to be that there is no federal statute directly address-
ing economic espionage or which otherwise protects proprietary information in a thor-
ough, systematic manner. The statute that federal prosecutors principally rely upon to
combat this type of crime, the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act (18
U.S.C. § 2314), was passed in the 1930s in an effort to prevent the movement of stolen
property across state lines by criminals attempting to evade the jurisdiction of state
and local law enforcement officials. That statute relates to "goods, wares, or merchan-
dise." Consequently, prosecutors have found it not particularly well suited to deal with
situations involving "intellectual property," property which by its nature is not physi-
cally transported from place to place. Courts have been reluctant to extend the reach of
this law to this new type of property. One court has held that "the element of physical
'goods, wares, or merchandise' in sections 2314 and 2315 is critical. The limitation
which this places on the reach of the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act
is imposed by statute itself, and must be observed." United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
H.R. REP. No. 104-788 (1996).
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such information remotely. In this case, the information thief did
not have to go to the copying room and he did not have to get the
documents out of some central file and physically have his secre-
tary copy them. Rather, he was able to access the information us-
ing company passwords and he was able to transmit this stolen
information across state lines.
Furthermore, it is very difficult to trace this sort of theft be-
cause of the anonymity of the Internet. Finally, the amount of
information that is downloaded is limited only by the transmis-
sion speeds and exceeds the amount of data that can be stolen
physically. The bottom line of what we are facing as part of the
computer crime unit, is that criminal laws have not kept up with
this monumental change in how information is stored and how in-
formation is transmitted across state lines and across trans-na-
tional boundaries.

